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Abstract
Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in so-
cial dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding
issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in
which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known aca-
demic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive
game that integrates positive incentives (rewards) and negative incentives (punishments)
with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players’ incentives. The critical
assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for
their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incen-
tive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the
game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-
order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta) in-
centive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given in-
dividually (peer-to-peer) after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that
(1) second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2)
a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3) a system
with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches
cooperation, and (4) a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative
regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incen-
tives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game
does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives.
Author Summary
Although social dilemmas can be resolved if punishing non-cooperators or rewarding co-
operators works, such rewards and punishments, i.e., external incentives, entail certain ex-
penses. As a result, a cooperative player who shirks his or her duty to provide an incentive
to other players will emerge, and he or she will be more advantageous than an incentive-
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provider. In fact, the problem of excluding such cooperative incentive-non-providers, or
second-order free-riders, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this chal-
lenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (re-
wards) and negative incentives (punishments) with second-order incentives, which are
incentives for other players’ incentives. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for
a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups.
We show that second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative
regimes. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any
centralized institution or proactive system for incentives.
Introduction
Even though society is based on cooperation, achieving cooperation in social dilemmas is still a
big challenge. The free-rider problem, for example, hinders cooperation. Many studies have ad-
dressed this problem, and the methods proposed for solving it include giving players sufficient
ability to remember their direct [1] or indirect experiences [2]. The idea is that this additional
information generates cooperation through direct or indirect reciprocity. Other research has
attempted to solve the problem by assigning tags [3], reputations [4], spatial structures [5] or
networks [6] to players in the game. A third approach is to give players choices other than sim-
ply whether or not to contribute. A drawback of this approach, however, is that there may be a
loner, i.e., a player who does not participate in the game [7, 8], or a joker, i.e., a destroyer who
damages the public good [9]. Some researchers have devised another sort of game that pro-
motes cooperation by giving players incentives explicitly. Important incentives for the evolu-
tion of cooperation are rewards and punishments as they tend to capture strong views of
human nature [10, 11]. The approach we took integrates positive incentives such as rewarding
and negative ones such as punishing into a system for promoting cooperation.
A meta-analysis of reviews on reward and punishment systems using a common framework
[12] revealed that this approach is still controversial. Here, we tackle this issue by focusing on
three perspectives: (1) the contrast between an individual incentive system and a centralized in-
stitutional one, (2) an incentive-integrated punishment and reward system, and (3) incentives
on a meta-level.
First, many studies have focused on either individually-dealt-with punishments or rewards.
While some studies [13–16] have shown that a costly punishment can effectively achieve coop-
eration, others [17–21] have shown just the opposite. Some researchers claim that the findings
of peer-punishment studies may not be broadly applicable to modern human societies, because
rewards and punishments are typically carried out by rules-bound institutions [22, 23] rather
than by individuals. The reason might be a difficulty of establishing and maintaining such a
peer-punishment system because it does not involve a nomocracy, i.e., a proactive or ex-
ante commitment.
Second, should a free-rider be punished and/or should a contributor be rewarded? Experi-
mental studies [24, 25] have indicated that rewards and punishments induce similar levels of
cooperation when the incentive is very large. Economists have used experimental games to
study the effects of positive and negative incentives (i.e., rewards and punishments) on the pro-
pensity to collaborate [26]. A theoretical study [27] showed that a punishment is more effective
than a reward because these incentives have an asymmetric relationship with one another. In
other words, punishments are not needed once cooperation is established, and thus, coopera-
tors do not need to pay the costs of punishment. On the other hand, attaining rewards requires
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participants to pay costs by following a cooperative strategy. The threat of a strong punishment
can achieve cooperation at a very low cost [28]. For an intermediate level of incentive, however,
although punishments can induce greater cooperation than rewards [25], they cannot do so
consistently [29]. Moreover, cooperation easily breaks down if both forms of incentive are re-
moved [30]. Compared with the numerous studies on punishments, there have been relatively
few on rewards [12, 24, 25, 29]. For example, an experimental study [31] explored the situation
in which unkind newcomers are strictly exploited and found that indirect rewards are effective
in such situations.
Third, in the approach we took, the focus is on meta-level incentives. When the incentive
for cooperation is either a punishment or reward, there is still the second-order free-rider prob-
lem. The effort made to maintain a cooperative society is a cost that must be defrayed by some-
one. Generally, a player who contributes to a game but never defrays the cost for providing
incentives is more evolutionarily adaptive than one who contributes to the game and does pay
the cost. This means that eventually no one defrays the cost of maintaining the incentive sys-
tem. The second-order free-rider problem can come down to the problem of costly incentives
[32]. One solution is to implement a second-order incentive system.
The pioneering work on meta-level incentives was performed by Axelrod [33]. He at-
tempted to evolve cooperation by imposing a second-order punishment on those who do not
impose a first-order punishment when one is called for. His model linked punishments against
non-punishers with punishments against non-cooperators. This assumption, that first-order
incentives and second-order ones are linked, or FO-SO-linkages, is critical for our study.
Yamagishi and Takahashi [34] were the first to point out the linkage issue and demonstrated
that a cooperative regime emerges if it is assumed that players have linkages between coopera-
tion and first-order incentives, or C-FO-linkages. Related studies have developed models that
assume C-FO-linkages have been analyzed [35, 36]. The existence of a C-FO-linkage, however,
is still not a foregone conclusion [37]. Some experimental studies [38, 39] showed that sanc-
tions enhance norm and cooperative behavior. An experimental study [40], conversely, con-
cluded there is a negative correlation between cooperative behaviors in prisoner’s dilemma
games and refusal behaviors in ultimatum games. Moreover, an analysis of large-scale panel
data of Germany [41] concluded that rewards and punishments have no relationship. Another
experiment [42] found that cooperation is not correlated with norm-enforcing punishments.
An experimental study [37], on the other hand, showed a significant correlation between coop-
eration and punishment; however, they unostentatiously admitted that their result was insuffi-
cient evidence for the existence of C-FO-linkages.
The C-FO-linkage issue is a relationship between two behaviors which differ qualitatively.
Considering this point, the relationship between first-order incentives and second-order incen-
tives is an alternative issue because they are both incentives. Kiyonari and Barclay [43] focused
on the FO-SO-linkage and showed its existence in their experiments on one-shot public good
games. Their study opened the door on analyses of models that assume FO-SO-linkages. Hilbe
et al [44] experimentally showed the rationality of a second-order punishment in an authorized
sanction system. We, in this paper, test a model that assumes a FO-SO-linkage in a peer-to-
peer incentive system.
We have developed a model of a meta-incentive game (MIG) that has second-order incen-
tives, i.e., incentives for other players to provide incentives. This analytical model can describe
the carrot-and-stick issue uniformly and comparatively. The model targets an individual incen-
tive system that integrates a positive side (reward) and a negative side (punishment) [45]. The
incentive we consider is an ex-post type applied after players engage in donation games, and
thus, no centralized institution with incentives is needed. An institution requires an ex-ante
commitment among players. Players should decide whether or not they will participate in the
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institution before playing the donation games [23, 46]. In order to resolve the second-order
free-rider problem, we suppose that there are three types of players in the MIG, i.e., a non-co-
operative incentive-non-provider as a first-order free-rider, a cooperative incentive-non-pro-
vider as a second-order free-rider, and a cooperative incentive-provider, and we will explore
the conditions under which cooperative incentive-providers survive.
Results
MIG players first play donation games and then provide incentives in answer to their actions
in the games. Incentives are provided not only for or against the others’ cooperative or non-co-
operative actions but also for the others’ incentive behaviors or lack thereof on third-
party players.
Players are divided into three sorts of strategist: a cooperative incentive-provider (CI), a co-
operative incentive-non-provider (CN), and a non-cooperative incentive-non-provider (NN).
Fig 1 shows an illustration of the MIG. The MIG consists of three stages (games): a donation
game (DG), a first-order incentive game (FIG), and a second-order incentive game (SIG). Note
that each player has perfect information, so each one knows all the players’ actions.
Fig 1. Illustration of meta-incentive game (MIG). Four individuals are randomly drawn from the population
and randomly assigned to one of four roles, recipient, donor, first-order player, and second-order player. In
the first stage, the donor decides whether to help the recipient. In the second stage, the first-order player
decides whether to provide an incentive for the donor; and in the last stage, the second-order player decides
whether to provide an incentive to the first-order player.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004232.g001
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The population is infinitely large and well-mixed. The frequencies of the three strategies fol-
low replicator dynamics describing a natural law whereby the higher one’s payoff is the more
frequent one’s strategy becomes. Let x, y, and z be the frequencies of CI, CN, and NN, respec-
tively. Naturally, x+y+z = 1. The equations are formulated as
_x ¼ xðUCI  U Þ;
_y ¼ yðUCN  U Þ;
_z ¼ zðUNN  U Þ;
ð1Þ
where UCI, UCN, UNN, and U are, respectively, the average payoffs of CI, CN, NN, and all the
players. U is given by
U ¼ xUCI þ yUCN þ zUNN : ð2Þ
Now let us describe the parameter notations needed to calculate a player’s (expected) payoff.
Let c be the cost of donation, b be the receiver’s benefit, F1 be the fine imposed as a first-order
punishment, P1 be the cost of a first-order punishment, A1 be the amount of a first-order re-
ward, R1 be the cost of a first-order reward, FP be the fine for freeriding for the first-order pun-
ishment, PP be the cost for freeriding for the first-order punishment, AP be the amount of the
reward for the punisher, RP be the cost of the reward for the punisher, FR be the fine for freerid-
ing for giving a reward, PR be the cost for freeriding for giving a reward, and AR be the amount
of rewarding a rewarder, and RR be the cost of rewarding a rewarder. All these values should be
non-negative constants.
We will avoid analytical difficulties due to the usage of many parameters by defining a sim-
ple meta-incentive game (S-MIG) using two parameters: the incentive cost-effect ratio (μ),
which represents the proportion of a fine or award that incentive-receivers should pay or re-




























We assume that μ> 1 and 0< δ< 1. We can set c = 1 without loss of generality. An S-MIG
is perfectly described by a duplet (μ, δ).
Finally, before analyzing our model, we define all 24 possible configurations of MIG in Fig
2. For example, the P-type MIG has only first-level punishments. In this type, players can give
or receive neither a first-level reward nor a second-level incentive. The PR type has first-level
punishments for non-cooperators and second-level rewards for punishers.
We explore the conditions under which a cooperative equilibrium (x> 0) emerges by ana-
lyzing the replicator dynamics on different types of S-MIG. As shown in Methods, the dynam-
ics of S-MIGs can be classified into four groups. Fig 2 illustrates the existence condition for the
basin of attraction and the local stabilities on the point (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0) of all types, and Fig 3
shows the phase portraits of the representative S-MIGs on a 2-dimensional simplex.
We identified certain features of the second-order free-rider problem. First, as the second-
order free-rider problem warns, cooperation cannot be maintained in any system with only
first-order incentives. Similarly, cooperation does not arise even if the system has second-order
incentives but no second-order incentives for first-order rewards. This is because rewarding
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PLOS Computational Biology | DOI:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004232 May 14, 2015 5 / 17
others is equivalent to a prisoner’s dilemma game or a donation game, so incentive-providers
as well as cooperators diminish over time.
Second, because of the neutral drift effect, no system without a reward side can keep its posi-
tion when cooperation dominates. This is another aspect of the second-order free-rider prob-
lem. These results reveal two important facts about reward systems: a second-order incentive
system for first-order rewards is better than a non-incentive system on the reward side for pro-
moting cooperation, and a system without second-order incentives for first-order rewards is
worse than the non-incentive system.
Third, any system with second-order incentives for first-order rewards can produce a stable
cooperative regime under specific conditions. To do so, a certain number of cooperative incen-
tive-providers are needed. If their numbers are small, they cannot survive.
Fourth, the conditions under which a cooperative regime emerges depend on the system. A
system with second-order rewards has the strictest condition, and the conditions become less
stringent for a system with second-order punishments and a system with second-order both re-
wards and punishments.
Finally, the condition on the frequency of incentive-providers under which a cooperative re-
gime can be sustained also depends on the system. When the cost-effect ratio of incentives is
sufficiently large, the lower limit of the frequency of incentive-providers in a system with sec-
ond-order rewards for first-order incentives is lower than that in a system with second-order
punishments for first-order incentives.
Fig 2. Illustration of replicator dynamics analyses for each type of S-MIG. This figure illustrates all 24
types of S-MIG. The abbreviations are defined in Table 1. Their vertical layering in the figure reflects the
existence condition for the basin of attraction on the point (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0) related to (μ, δ) under which a
cooperative regime emerges. The frames represent the form of local stability at point (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0): the
point is unstable for each type in the top frame which corresponds to (A) in Fig 3, is a non-isolated equilibrium
for each type in the bottom right frame which corresponds to (B) in Fig 3, and is asymptotically stable for each
type in the bottom left frame which corresponds to (C) and (D) in Fig 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004232.g002
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Discussion
What can resolve the second-order free-rider problem? Sigmund et al [23] achieved stabilizing
cooperative regimes by using pool punishments instead of peer punishments. Is it possible to
maintain such regimes without any proactive institution? Our model demonstrates that assum-
ing first-order and second-order incentives are linked can lead to a solution without any social
costs or a punishment fund. The assumed linkage means that individuals who are willing to
provide incentives would automatically provide meta-incentives as well. The consequences are
that although the model allows second-order free riders, it does not allow third-order free rid-
ers. (If they were allowed, they would again destabilize cooperation.) Moreover, efficiency is
traded for stability in Sigmund et al’s model, because individuals pay for a punishment fund
without as yet knowing who the free riders to be punished are [23]. In cotrast, our model can
search for an efficient incentive level for maintaining cooperative regimes, because individuals
Fig 3. Replicator dynamics analysis of representative S-MIGs on 2-dimensional simplex. The triangle represents the state space, Δ = {(x, y, z) : x, y,
z 0, x+y+z = 1}, where x, y, and z are respectively the frequencies of the cooperative incentive-providers, cooperative incentive-non-providers, and non-
cooperative incentive-non-providers. ðm; dÞ ¼ ð3; 1
2
Þ. (A) PR+R, (B) PP, (C) PB+RB(Full), and (D) RB. The abbreviations are defined in Table 1. In (A), (x, y, z)
= (1, 0, 0) is unstable, so cooperation is never achieved regardless of the values of (μ, δ). In (B), the whole line z = 0 consists of fixed points, and thus, neutral
drift is possible. In (C) and (D), (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0) is a locally asymptotically stable point depending on the values of (μ, δ), and thus, a cooperative regime can
emerge. In (C), the unstable equilibrium in the internal part on z = 0, Kz, is a saddle, and that on y = 0, Ky, is a source. In (D), Kz is a source, while Ky is
a saddle.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004232.g003
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can reactively incur costs for incentives with knowing who is to be given an incentive. Thus,
one of the implications of the linkage assumption is that a more efficient incentive system for
stabilizing cooperation would be an intermediate of the traditional peer and pool
incentive systems.
We note that a similar amount of cooperation could also be achieved if there was a linkage
between cooperation and first-order incentives (C-FO linkage, see Methods). This linkage
means an alternative model with two strategies, i.e., defectors and cooperators who automati-
cally also provide first-order incentives. As shown in Methods, our model can indeed cover a
case that assumes C-FO linkages instead of FO-SO linkages in specific parameters.
For our model incentives for reward are necessary for cooperative regimes. If players play in
a non-incentive system on the reward side, a punishment function does not work when cooper-
ation is achieved. That is to say, they cannot respond to an invasion of neutral mutants who do
not provide incentives. As a result, cooperation suddenly collapses. This is why Axelrod’s simu-
lation [33] cannot keep a cooperative regime for a long time [47–49]. Therefore, if players play
in a non-incentive system on the reward side, another mechanism is needed, e.g., a social vac-
cine proposed by Yamamoto and Okada [50], to maintain cooperative regimes.
How about a system with first-order reward and without second-order incentives for the re-
ward? Here, worse comes to worst because it becomes free from the possibility of staying a co-
operative regime temporally. When a cooperative regime is achieved, players do not need their
punishment functions, and thus, only the first-order reward function works. As the second-
order free-rider problem indicates, cooperative incentive-non-providers beat cooperative in-
centive-providers because they don’t bear the burden of paying for rewards.
Second-order incentives for first-order rewards are necessary for achieving and maintaining
robust cooperative regimes and to resolve the second-order free-rider problem. That is, a
mechanism is needed to make it beneficial for a player to give a first-order reward. Assuming
that players who tend to provide incentives for other players’ cooperative or non-cooperative
behaviors also tend to provide incentives for their incentive behaviors, the second-order free-
rider problem can be completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta)incentive.
In our model, moreover, incentives are performed ex-post and individually, and thus the sys-
tem does not need a centralized institution or ex-ante commitment. Many studies on non-
meta-level incentives have shown that punishment is more effective than a reward. We have
identified a possible explanation as to why people prefer second-order rewards to second-order
punishments. Kiyonari and Barclay’s experimental study [43] supports this—they found that
people readily provided second-order rewards toward those who rewarded cooperators while
they did not administer second-order punishments to non-punishers because the reward sys-
tems were more easily supported by higher order incentives and were thus more likely
to persist.
Which incentive should a designer of an MIG choose? If the cost-effect ratio of incentives is
sufficiently large, even a handful of cooperative incentive-providers can beat non-cooperative
incentive-non-providers if the designer uses a system with rewards for incentives instead of a
system with punishments for incentives.
Our work differs from Sasaki et al’s model of integrating rewards and punishments, which
was designed for an institutional system with a compulsory entrance fee and thus no option of
second-order free riders [51]. Kendal et al [52] analyzed a model of second-order peer rewards
for punishers, but did not consider rewards for cooperators who contribute in the game. Our
paper is a pioneering analysis of MIGs; as such, we only dealt with a minimum deviation and an-
alyze pro-social incentives and left anti-social punishments [53] and anti-social rewards as topics
for future study. Our model assumes an infinitely well-mixed population, and this assumption
should be loosened in the future. Szolnoki and Perc [54] compared the effect of a reward with
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that of a punishment in a spatial public goods game. Chen and Perc [55] studied the optimal dis-
tribution of institutional incentives in a public goods game on a scale-free network.
The asymmetry of the effects of rewards and punishments might be evident in the cost-ef-
fect ratio. Although it may be natural that a fine handed out as punishment should be larger
than its cost, can the reward be larger than its cost? We believe that this balances out the risk of
second-order free-riders emerging. Of course, we leave open the possibility of incorporating
asymmetric reward and punishment effects as a future extension of a system.
Methods
In this section, we analyze a meta-incentive game (MIG) by solving replicator equations.
Table 1 gives brief descriptions of all 24 types of the game.
Table 1. Types of MIG.
Type Brief description Parameters used
P Punishment for non-cooperators on 1st level F1, P1
R Reward for cooperators on 1st level A1, R1
P+R Both reward and punishment on 1st level (as well as P-type plus R-type) F1, P1, A1, R1
PP Punishment for non-cooperators on 1st level and punishment for non-punishers on 2nd level F1, P1, FP, PP
PR Punishment for non-cooperators on 1st level and reward for punishers on 2nd level F1, P1, AP, RP
PB Punishments on both levels (as well as PP-type) and reward for punishers on 2nd level F1, P1, FP, PP, AP, RP
RP Reward for cooperators on 1st level and punishment for non-rewarders on 2nd level A1, R1, FR, PR
RR Reward for cooperators on 1st level and reward for rewarders on 2nd level A1, R1, AR, RR
RB Rewards on both levels (as well as RR-type) and punishment for non-rewarders on 2nd level A1, R1, FR, PR, AR, RR
P+RP Both reward and punishment on 1st level and punishment for non-rewarders on 2nd level A1, R1, F1, P1, FR, PR
P+RR Both reward and punishment on 1st level and reward for rewarders on 2nd level A1, R1, F1, P1, AR, RR
P+RB Both reward and punishment on 1st level, and both punishment for non-rewarders and reward for rewarders
on 2nd level
A1, R1, F1, P1, AR, RR, FR,
PR
PP+R Both reward and punishment on 1st level and punishment for non-punisher on 2nd level F1, P1, A1, R1, FP, PP
PR+R Both reward and punishment on 1st level and reward for punisher on 2nd level F1, P1, A1, R1, AP, RP
PB+R Both reward and punishment on 1st level, and both punishment for non-punishers and reward for punishers
on 2nd level
F1, P1, A1, R1, FP, PP, AP,
RP
PP+RP Both reward and punishment on 1st level, and punishments for both non-punishers and non-rewarders on
2nd level
F1, P1, A1, R1, FP, PP, FR,
PR
PP+RR Both reward and punishment on 1st level, and both punishment for non-punishers and reward for rewarders
on 2nd level
F1, P1, A1, R1, FP, PP, AR,
RR
PP+RB Full-type excluded reward for punishers on 2nd level All except AP, RP
PR+RP Both reward and punishment on 1st level, and both punishment for non-rewarders and reward for punishers
on 2nd level
F1, P1, A1, R1, FR, PR, AP,
RP
PR+RR Both reward and punishment on the 1st level, and rewards for both punishers and rewarders on the 2nd level A1, R1, F1, P1, AR, RR, AP,
RP
PR+RB The Full-type excluded punishment for non-punishers on 2nd level All except FP, PP
PB+RP Full-type excluded reward for rewarders on 2nd level All except AR, RR
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Expected payoffs of the players
The expected payoffs of the players are
UCI ¼ bðx þ yÞ  c ½ðx þ yÞR1 þ zP1 þ xA1
 ½ðx þ yÞxRR þ ðx þ yÞðy þ zÞPR þ zxRP
þ zðy þ zÞPP þ x½ðx þ yÞAR þ zAP;
UCN ¼ bðx þ yÞ  cþ xA1  x½ðx þ yÞFR þ zFP;
UNN ¼ bðx þ yÞ  xF1  x½ðx þ yÞFR þ zFP:
ð3Þ
Let us explain the terms of UCI. The first term represents the benefit of donation, whereas
the second term gives the cost of donation (because one is a cooperator) in the DG stage. The
third term represents the costs of the first-order incentivization: rewarding a cooperator and
punishing a non-cooperator. The fourth term represents the first-order reward for cooperating.
The fifth term represents the costs of the second-order incentivization and consists of four
parts, i.e., rewarding those who have rewarded a cooperator, punishing those who have not re-
warded a cooperator, rewarding those who have punished a non-cooperator, and punishing
those who have not punished a non-cooperator. Finally, the last term describes the second-
order rewards for rewarding a cooperator and punishing a non-cooperator. Similar explana-
tions can be applied to the other expected payoffs, UCN and UNN.
Replicator dynamics analysis for various types of S-MIG
Using Eqs (1), (2), and (3), the replicator equations are calculated as _x ¼ xf1; _y ¼ yf2, and
_z ¼ zf3, where
f1 ¼ cz  ðy þ zÞ½ðx þ yÞR1 þ zP1 þ xzðA1 þ F1Þ
 ðy þ zÞ½ðx þ yÞxRR þ ðx þ yÞðy þ zÞPR þ zxRP
þ zðy þ zÞPP þ x½ðx þ yÞðy þ zÞðAR þ FRÞ
þ zðy þ zÞðAP þ FPÞ;
f2 ¼ cz þ x½ðx þ yÞR1 þ zP1 þ xzðA1 þ F1Þ
þ x½ðx þ yÞxRR þ ðx þ yÞðy þ zÞPR þ zxRP
þ zðy þ zÞPP  x½ðx þ yÞxðAR þ FRÞ
þ zxðAP þ FPÞ;
f3 ¼ cðx þ yÞ þ x½ðx þ yÞR1 þ zP1  xðx þ yÞðA1 þ F1Þ
þ x½ðx þ yÞxRR þ ðx þ yÞðy þ zÞPR þ zxRP
þ zðy þ zÞPP  x½ðx þ yÞxðAR þ FRÞ
þ zxðAP þ FPÞ:
ð4Þ
We prove that there is no equilibrium at any internal point (x, y, z) in S-MIG in the follow-
ing subsection, and thus, here, it is enough to conduct an analysis of the borders. Moreover,
there is no equilibrium at any point on the line x = 0, except two corners ((y, z) = (0, 1), (1, 0)).
This is because, _y ¼ yð1 yÞ < 0 on the line x = 0, and thus, y always decreases. Hence, we
will only deal with the _x function on the lines y = 0 and z = 0. On those two lines, that function
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is calculated as _x jy¼0 ¼ xð1 xÞf ðxÞ and _x jz¼0 ¼ xð1 xÞgðxÞ, where
f ðxÞ ¼ 1 xR1  ð1 xÞP1 þ xðA1 þ F1Þ  x2RR
 xð1 xÞPR  xð1 xÞRP  ð1 xÞ2PP
þ x2ðAR þ FRÞ þ xð1 xÞðAP þ FPÞ;
gðxÞ ¼ R1  xRR  ð1 xÞPR þ xAR þ xFR:
ð5Þ
In order to exemplify how to analyze each type of the S-MIG, we deal with the RB type as a
representative and derive their equations of f(x) and g(x). In the type, F1, P1, FP, PP, AP and RP
should be zero because there has no incentive system on the punishment side. Moreover, using
c = 1 and definitions of μ and δ, R1 = δ, A1 = μδ, RR = PR = δ
2 and AR = FR = μδ
2. Substituting
them into f1 in Eq (4), we get
_x ¼ x½z  dðy þ zÞðx þ yÞ þ mdxz  d2ðy þ zÞðx þ yÞ þ 2md2xðx þ yÞðy þ zÞ:
Therefore, we derive Eq (5) of the RB-type S-MIG as
_xjy¼0 ¼ xð1 xÞð1 dx þ mdx  d2x þ 2md2x2Þ;
and
_xjz¼0 ¼ xð1 xÞðd d2 þ 2md2xÞ:
Table 2 shows the equations for _x jy¼0 and _x jz¼0 for each type of S-MIG. Using Eq (5), we
can calculate an existence condition for the basin of attraction on the point (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0).
If _x jx¼1;y¼0 > 0 and _x jx¼1;z¼0 > 0 are satisfied, the point (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0) is asymptotically
stable, and thus, a cooperative regime emerges. The dynamics of each type of S-MIG are classi-
fied into four groups. In what follows, we will deal with one representative type in each group.
The remainder can be similarly derived.
The R, P+R, PP+R, PR+R, and PB+R types belong in the first group. Each type of this group
has a globally stable point (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1), so cooperation is never achieved regardless of the
values of (μ, δ). _x jz¼0 < 0 is satisfied; thus, (1, 0, 0) is unstable. Therefore, the only stable equi-
librium point is (0, 0, 1), as shown in Fig 3(A).
The P, PP, PR, and PB types belong in the second group. The whole line z = 0 consists of
fixed points because _x jz¼0 ¼ 0 is always satisfied. Each type of this group has two patterns of
behavior depending on the values of (μ, δ). In one, all the fixed points on the line z = 0 are un-
stable, and thus, there is a globally stable point (0, 0, 1), as in the first group. In the other, some
of the fixed points are stable if x > 1md when m >
1
d, as shown in the following subsection. Note
that this behavior also satisfies an existence condition for the basin of attraction on the point




2d2ð1 mÞ < 0 and @f
@x
ð1Þ ¼ mdð1 dÞ þ dð1þ dÞ > 0 prove that f(x) is an increasing func-
tion. Moreover, f(1) = −1+μδ> 0 implies that the point (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0) is asymptotically sta-
ble. Even in the second pattern, however, the point (1, 0, 0) is not stable for a long time. This is
because, the whole line z = 0 consists of fixed points, and thus, neutral drift is possible. Occa-
sionally, xmoves to an unstable equilibrium, and this type eventually reaches (0, 0, 1). The
phase diagram of the PP-type S-MIG is shown in Fig 3(B).
The third group, consisting of types which include either the RP or RR, and P+RB, PP+RB,
PR+RB, and PB+RB (Full) types, has two patterns of behavior depending on the values of (μ,
δ). In one, there is a globally stable point (0, 0, 1), as in the first group. In the other, another lo-
cally asymptotically stable point (1, 0, 0) can exist. This group has three existence conditions
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for the basin of attraction on the point (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0): m > 1þ 1d for the types which include
RR, m > 1d for the types which include RP, and m >
1þd
2d for the P+RB, PP+RB, PR+RB, and PB
+RB (Full) types. Let us examine the PB+RB(Full)-type S-MIG as a representative type. Here,
_x jz¼0 ¼ dxð1 xÞð2mdx  d 1Þ; hence, the dynamics on the line z = 0, on one hand, are bis-
table and x ¼ 1þd
2md is a fixed point that separates the two basins of attraction when m >
1þd
2d is sat-
isfied. On the other hand, the dynamics on y = 0 depends on f(x). @f
@x
ðxÞ ¼ 2mdð1þ dÞ > 0
shows that _x jy¼0 is an increasing function. f(0)< 0 and f(1) = −1−δ−δ2+2μδ(1+δ)> 0 when
the existence condition for the basin of attraction on the point (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0) is satisfied.
Therefore, the dynamics on y = 0 are also bistable, and x ¼ 1þdþd2
2mdð1þdÞ is a fixed point that separates
the two basins of attraction. Fig 3(C) shows the phase diagram of the Full-type S-MIG.
The final group, consisting of only the RB type, is the same as the third except for the direc-
tion of the dynamics in the internal space of the basin of attraction for cooperation (see Fig 3
(D)). In this type, the unstable equilibrium point on the line z = 0 is a source while those in the
third group are saddles. Likewise, the unstable equlibrium point on y = 0 in the RB type is a
saddle, while those in the third group are sources. Using the analytical method of the following
subsections, we can calculate the eigenvalues of the matrices derived by linearization of the dy-




2mdÞdð1þ dÞ, and both are positive. Local stability theory says that an equilibrium






PP −1−δ(1−x)+μδx−δ2(1−x)2+μδ2 x(1−x) 0
PR −1−δ(1−x)+μδx−δ2 x(1−x)+μδ2 x(1−x) 0
PB −1−δ(1−x)+μδx−δ2(1−x)+2μδ2 x(1−x) 0
RP −1−δx+μδx−δ2 x(1−x)+μδ2 x2 −δ−δ2(1−x)+μδ2 x
RR −1−δx+μδx−δ2 x2+μδ2 x2 −δ−δ2 x+μδ2 x
RB −1−δx+μδx−δ2 x+2μδ2 x2 −δ−δ2+2μδ2 x
P+RP −1−δ+2μδx−δ2 x(1−x)+μδ2 x2 −δ−δ2(1−x)+μδ2 x
P+RR −1−δ+2μδx−δ2 x2+μδ2 x2 −δ−δ2 x+μδ2 x
P+RB −1−δ+2μδx−δ2 x+2μδ2 x2 −δ−δ2+2μδ2 x
PP+R −1−δ+2μδx−δ2(1−x)2+μδ2 x(1−x) −δ
PR+R −1−δ+2μδx−δ2 x(1−x)+μδ2 x(1−x) −δ
PB+R −1−δ+2μδx−δ2(1−x)+2μδ2 x(1−x) −δ
PP+RP −1−δ+2μδx−δ2(1−x)+μδ2 x −δ−δ2(1−x)+μδ2 x
PP+RR −1−δ+2μδx−δ2[x2+(1−x)2]+μδ2 x −δ−δ2 x+μδ2 x
PP+RB −1−δ+2μδx−δ2[1−x(1−x)]+μδ2 x(x+1) −δ−δ2+2μδ2 x
PR+RP −1−δ+2μδx−2δ2 x(1−x)+μδ2 x −δ−δ2(1−x)+μδ2 x
PR+RR −1−δ+2μδx−δ2 x+μδ2 x −δ−δ2 x+μδ2 x
PR+RB −1−δ+2μδx−δ2 x(2−x)+μδ2 x(x+1) −δ−δ2+2μδ2 x
PB+RP −1−δ+2μδx−δ2(1−x)(x+1)+μδ2 x(2−x) −δ−δ2(1−x)+μδ2 x
PB+RR −1−δ+2μδx−δ2[1−x(1−x)]+μδ2 x(2−x) −δ−δ2 x+μδ2 x
PB+RB −1−δ+2μδx−δ2+2μδ2 x −δ−δ2+2μδ2 x
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004232.t002
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with two positive eigenvalues is unstable and an equilibrium with one positive eigenvalue and
one negative eigenvalue is a saddle. We can verify that the types of the third group have
inverse stabilities. First, we deal with the Full-type S-MIG. Let λ1 and λ2 be the eigenvalues of
the matrix derived by linearization of the dynamics around the equilibrium point (x, y, 0)
on the line z = 0. λ1 λ2 = −y
 δ2(1+δ)< 0. Moreover, in the case of the RR-type S-MIG,
λ1 λ2 = −x
 y δ2 < 0. The other cases are omitted.
Finally, we compare the lower limits of x of the basins of attraction for cooperation (x, y, z)
= (1, 0, 0) on y = 0. Let fD(x) and xD be
_x jy¼0
xz
and the lower limit of x of the basin of attraction on
the line y = 0 in the D-type S-MIG for D 2 {P, R, . . ., PB+RB}. Basically, the more complex
the type is, the lower its lower limit of x becomes. For example, we will prove xP+RB < xP+RR.
fP+RB(x) = −1−δ+2μδx−δ
2 x+2μδ2 x2 and fP+RR(x) = −1−δ+2μδx−δ
2 x2+μδ2 x2 are in Table 2.
@fPþRB
@x
ðxÞ > 0 and @fPþRR
@x
ðxÞ > 0 imply that both functions are increasing. Note that fD(xD) = 0.
fP+RB(xP+RR) = δ
2 xP+RR[xP+RR(1+μ)−1] and fPþRRð 11þmÞ < 0 then fP+RB(xP+RR)> 0. Therefore,
xP+RB < xP+RR. Moreover, some equivalence relations can be derived. For example, let us com-
pare xRR with xRP. fRR(x) and fRP(x) are increasing functions because their partial derivatives
are positive in 0< x< 1. fRR(xRP) = δ
2 xRP(1−2xRP) and fRPð12Þ ¼ ðm1Þdð2þdÞ4  1 are derived.
Therefore, if m > 4dðdþ2Þ þ 1, then xRP < 12 and xRR < xRP.
m > m0 , xR < xP;
m > m10 , xPR < xPP , xRR < xRP;
m > m11 , xPþRR < xPþRP , xPRþR < xPPþR;
m > m12 , xPPþRR < xPPþRP , xPRþRR < xPRþRR
, xPRþRR < xPPþRR , xPRþRP < xPPþRP;
m > m13 , xPBþRR < xPBþRP , xPRþRB < xPPþRB;
where m0 ¼ 1þ 2d ; m10 ¼ 1þ 4dð2þdÞ ; m11 ¼ 1þ 4dð4þdÞ ; m12 ¼ 1þ 2dð2þdÞ ; m13 ¼ 1þ 4dð4þ3dÞ, and μ0
> μ10> μ11> μ12 > μ13.
Amodel of C-FO-linkage
The MIG assumes FO-SO-linkages. In this subsection, we analyze the replicator dynamics of a
model that assumes C-FO-linkages instead of FO-SO-linkages. Accordingly, cooperators auto-
matically provide first-order incentives, and thus, there is no CN, and no second-order incen-
tive is needed in the MIG. When y is set to zero and all the parameters for the second-order
incentives are also zero (FP = PP = AP = RP = FR = PR = AR = RR = 0), this new version, or an in-
centive game (IG), can be regarded as a model of the C-FO-linkages. We denote the three pos-
sible IG configurations as the P-type, R-type, and P+R type. The replicator equation of IG is
_x ¼ xð1 xÞ½ðA1 þ F1  R1 þ P1Þx  ðcþ P1Þ:
We can devise a simple incentive game (S-IG) by using μ, δ, and c = 1. All S-IG types have
two patterns of behavior depending on the values of (μ, δ). In one, there is a globally stable
point (x, z) = (0, 1). In the other, another locally asymptotically stable point (x, z) = (1, 0) can
exist. The existence condition for the basin of attraction at the stable point (1, 0) is m > 1d for a
P-type, m > 1þ 1d for an R-type, or m > 1þd2d for a P+R-type S-IG.
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Nonexistence of internal equilibrium
In this subsection, we prove that there is no equilibrium at any internal point on the 2-dimen-
sional simplex Δ = {(x, y, z) : x, y, z 0, x+y+z = 1}. Assume that (x, y, z) is an internal equi-
librium. On that point, Eq (4) should be 0. This is because x (y, z) is not zero, and thus, the
function _x ( _y; _z) can be divided by x(y, z). Using
_y jy¼y




Similarly, using _x jx¼x
x ¼
_y jy¼y
y ¼ 0, one gets
z R1 þ PR  P1  PP þ
RR  PR  RP þ PP þ AP þ FP  AR  FR
A1 þ F1
 
¼ R1 þ PR þ
RR  PR  AR  FR
A1 þ F1
ð6Þ
Table 3 shows the equations and solutions of z in Eq (6) for all 24 types of S-MIG. The solu-
tions of z in the PP and RP types are not unique when μδ = 1. At that time, however, x must
be 1. Therefore, there is no equilibrium for both types when 0< δ< 1.
If δ = 1 is permitted, the PB and RB types have internal equilibria at all points on
x ¼ x ¼ 1m. However, they are not stable. We will prove this and deal with the PB type as a rep-
resentative. When δ = 1, Eq (1) in the PB type is
_x ¼ xzðmx  1Þð3 2xÞ; _y ¼ yzðmx  1Þð1 2xÞ:
Now let us analyze the local stability of the point (x, y, z) around the equilibrium point (x,
y, z). Let x = x−x
, y = y−y
 and  = (x, y)
T, where T means transposition. As a result of the








because μx−1 = 0. The eigenvalues ofM are λ = 0, z(3−2x). These are non-negative, and
thus, any internal equilibrium is non-isolated and unstable. The eigenvalues in the case of the
RB type are λ = 0, z+2(x+y)(y+z), and thus, the same conclusion is reached.
Local stability of the line z = 0 in the P, PP, PR, and PB types
In this subsection, we analyze the local stabilities of the line z = 0 in the P, PP, PR, and PB types
of S-MIG. Here, we deal with the P-type S-MIG as a representative. Eq (1) becomes
_x ¼ xz½mdx  dðy þ zÞ  1; _y ¼ yz½mdx þ dx  1:
As is shown in the previous subsection, the linearization of the dynamics around the equi-
librium point (x, y, z) = (x, y, 0) leads to d
dt
¼ M, where x = x−x, y = y−y,  = (x, y)T, and
M ¼
x½1þ d ðmþ 1Þdx x½1þ d ðmþ 1Þdx
y½1 ðmþ 1Þdx y½1 ðmþ 1Þdx
 !
:
The eigenvalues ofM are λ = 0, 1−μδx, and thus, the whole line z = 0 consists of fixed points
and it is stable (unstable) when x > 1md (x <
1
md) as well as the PP, PR, and PB types.
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